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PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM LOCAL ASSESSMENT
CHURCHES, CEMETERIES AND CHARITIES

(Continued from the October Issue)
Section 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania is as follows :--"All taxes shall be uniform upon the
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected
under general laws; but the general assembly may, by general laws exempt from taxation public property used for
public purposes, actual places of religious worship, places
of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit,
and institutions of purely public charity."
In the previous section of this discussion it was pointed out that taxes are of two kinds, general taxes, assessed
periodically and local assessments, assessed but once for
each kind of local improvement. The constitutional right
of the legislature to exempt churches, cemeteries and charities from both forms of taxation has not been denied but
it has been hard to decide in many cases whether the act
creating the exemption was to be restricted in its effect
to general taxes or whether it was to be extended to local
assessments also.
In Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa.,
104, a church was assessed to pay for water pipes laid in
front of it. The exempting act extended to "all and every
county, road, city and school tax." The church was held
liable to assessment. Taxes were said to be those impositions levied to carry on the government, "for public pur-
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poses," whereas municipal charges are for the benefit of
the lot owners on a particular street, and the improvement
is supposed to add value to the property equal to the
charge.
On the other hand, a cemetery was held to be exempt
from liability for a sewer assessment because the act incorporating the cemetery company exempted it from "taxation except for state purpposes," the principle that an exPhila., 93 Pa., 129. Justice Sterrett defined taxation "as
the exercise of the inherent powers of government to compel contributions from persons and property for public purposes, either of a general or local nature. For general or
state purposes, the power of taxation has usually been exercised directly by the government, while for local purposes
it has generally been delegated to and exercised by the municipal sub-divisions of the state." He did not distinguish
between annual local taxes and special assessments.
He added that "it would be an easy task to show the wisdom and propriety of exempting cemeteries from local taxation."
It would appear that if this general exemption from
"taxation" included the sewer assessment, the more specific exemption from "city taxes" in the earlier ease would
have included the water pipe assessment. In Pettibone v.
Smith, 150 Pa., at p. 128, Justice Green explained the later
decision on the ground that the exemption being "from taxation except for state purposes," the principle that an exception in a statute excludes all other exceptions required
that the word taxation be given its broadest possible meaning. The court was not free to create exceptions of its
own, as was done in the earlier case by the court's restricted definition of the word "tax." Justice Green continued:
"Itisnot true that an assessment is precisely the same thing
as a tax, and it is entirely certain that a tax is not an assessment. In a general way a tax is an impost upon the
citizen for the support of the government and a municipal assessment is a contribution levied upon the ownership
of land to defray the expense of its improvement."
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In Erie v. Church, 105 Pa., 278, the church was assessed for a sewer and it invoked the act of May 14, 1874, P.
L., 158, exempting churches from taxation. The same act
exempted court houses, schools, jails, etc., and as they are
not liable to assessment, the court thought it must have
been intended to include assessments among the taxes from
which churches were exempted. The court referred to
various cases holding that the municipal power of assessment emanates from the power to tax and argued from
this that an exemption from city and borough taxes would
include assessments. It seems impossible to justify this
decision, if the first decision above referred to is correct.
As was said by Judge Rice at p. 122 of 150 Pa., "After a
careful comparison of the statute construed in the case of
Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church and that construed
in Erie v. Church, it seems difficult to reconcile the two decisions." If public property is exempt from assessment
without the aid of an exempting statute but churches are
exempt only when a statute expressly exempts them from
assessment, how does it follow that a statute, exempting from "taxation" merely, will operate to exempt from
assessment also, if public property is mentioned in the same
act?
CASES INVOLVING THE POLICE POWER

In Wilkinsburg Boro. v. Home for Aged Women, 131
Pa., 109, the distinction was first made between assessments collected in the exercise of the police power and those
collected in the exercise of the taxing power. The borough, under the act of '51, called on the charity to construct
a new sidewalk in the place of an old and dangerous one,
and the notice being disregarded, it constructed the walk itself and sought to collect the expenses from the charity.
It was held to be no defense that -its charter exempted its
property from taxation, as the charge was not in the nature
of a tax. "This is a duty imposed directly upon the property owner," says Justice Paxson, "and is in the nature of
a police regulation. It is no more a tax, or a municipal
assessment in the nature of a tax, than would be the im-
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position of any other duty by virtue of the police powers of
the borough, with a penalty for its violation. This footway was a public nuisance, dangerous in its character, and
the fact that the defendant is a charity and exempt from
taxation, does not authorize it to maintain a nuisance. It
could be required to abate it precisely as in the case of
any other corporation or individual."
To have been accurate, the last sentence should have
read: "Any other corporation except a railroad," for it
was held in Mt. Pleasant Boro v. R. R., 138 Pa., 365, that
a railroad company may not be made to pay for even a sidewalk along its roadbed, though it may be liable if the walk
runs in front of its depot or other property.
In the case of Home for Aged Women, Justice Paxson
added: "We regret, for the sake of this deserving charity, that we are unable to reach a different conclusion. The
law is too plain, however, to admit of even a doubt.".. Within a year, however, the railroad case arose and the doctrine
as to universal liability for nonperformance of duties imposed by municipalities in the exercise of the police power
was forgotten and the duty to pay for paving sidewalks
was treated as no greater than the duty to pay for any street
improvement.
In Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 143 Pa., 367, the charity
was held liable to assessment for the cost of curbing in
front of the property. The duty imposed was said to be
in the nature of a police regulation and the decision was
rested on the authority of the Wilkinsburg case, aboVe.
"The amount collected by the city is not in any proper sense
of the word a tax. It is a liability incurred for neglect to
perform a duty imposed by the police power of the city."
So in New Castle City v. Stone Church Grave Yard,
172 Pa., 86, and 37 W. N. C., 283, the graveyard was held
liable to assessment for paving the sidewalk, though the
church had dissolved and the graveyard was filled with
graves, so that it produced no revenue at all. Green, J.
treated the case as an ordinary one of assessment and held
that even so it was not exempt. No reference was made
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to the decision of Justice Paxson in the Mt. Pleasant Boro.
case, above, in which he says: "It requires no argument
to show that the paving of a footway by the side of a railroad track can confer no possible benefit upon the property
known as the right of way; hence, the whole theory which
justifies such charges fails in this instance." If so, doesn't
it fail equally in the case of a crowded graveyard of a dissolved congregation?
OTHER CASES INVOLVING THE TAXING POWER

Following the Erie case were several other cases holding charities exempt from assessment for water pipes and
sewers. They are Phila. v. Church of St. James, 134 Pa.,
207; Phila. v. Pa. Hospital, 154 Pa., 9, and Erie City v. Y.
M. C. A., 151 Pa., 168. In these cases, however, the
court's attention was not called to the possibility of
distinguishing between special assessments and general
taxes. In each it was held that the properties in question
were within the classes exempt under the constitution and the act of '74 and the counsel for the municipalities took it for granted that this settled the
question. At p. 539 of 178 Pa., Justice Green says they
are to be regarded as overruled in so far as they appear to
conflict with Broad St. Church's Appeal, 165 Pa., 475.
This case involved an -assessment for street paving. The
Supreme Court held that such an assessment was not within the meaning of the constitutional exemption from taxation of places of religious worship. "The constitutional exemption relates to taxes proper, or general public contributions, levied and collected by the state or by its authorized municipal agencies for general gove metal purposes, as distinguished from peculiar forms of taxation or
special assessments imposed upon property, within limited
areas, for the payment of local improvements therein, by
which the property assessed is specially and peculiarly
benefitted and enhanced in value, to an amount at least
equal to the assessment. There is such an obvious distinction between all forms of general taxation and this

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

species of local or special taxation that we cannot think the
latter was intended to be within the constitutional exemption."
It was upon this decision that the decision in New Castie City v. Stone Church Grave Yard, supra, was rested.
Likewise the decision in Beltzhoover Borough v. Heirs of
Jacob Beltzhoover, 173 Pa., 213, was rested upon these two
decisions. It was to the effect that a burial ground, not
held for profit, was liable to be assessed to pay for a street
improvement. So in Phila. v. Sulger, 23 D. R., 321, a
church was held assessable to pay for constructing a sewer.
The first sign of a possible abandonment of this position appears in Phila. v. Burial Ground Society, 178 Pa.,
533. This was an attempt to collect part of the cost of a
water main by assessment against the cemetery. The majority of the court held the question to be res judicata,and
to be covered by the cases just referred to. "We do not
think a distinction can be maintained between the paving
of a street and the laying of water pipe. They are both
municipal improvements of a local and special character,
and, theoretically at least, each must be supposed to confer
a benefit upon the adjacent property." Michener v. City,
118 Pa., 535, is cited to show that it is no objection that the
improvement is of no real benefit to property assessed.
But Justice Williams filed a vigorous dissenting opinion
and urged a return to the line of cases overruled in the
Broad Street Church's appeal, supra. "Some thousands
of sleepers," said he, "are r-sting in these little sacred enclosures. Over their remains stand the head stones and
monuments which the willing hands, prompted by the loving hearts of survivors, have reared to mark the spot where
their lost ones sleep, and to bear the name of the sleeper.
Though they have not been owned by the corporation for
two generations, they are within the 'common inclosure,'
and are, as it is claimed, subject to the lien which has been
filed against it. It is proposed to sell them all in a lump,
upon a lien for a tax from which each and every one of
them is exempt, and deliver to the highest bidder at a
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sheriff's sale the graves of two generations with all that
pertains to them. The suggestion is as shocking to my
sense of justice as to my sensibilities."
The case 'of Phila. v. Franklin Cemetery, 2 Super.,
569, was before the Superior Court at the same time.
These graves were likewise assessed to pay for a water
pipe. The charter of the cemetery exempted it from all
"taxation.".. It had been used for over half a century and
was entirely occupied by its many thousands of graves.
Judge Orlady held that, "the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Broad St. Church'o Appeal, 165 Pa., 475, is conclusive of this question." * * * "In as far as any of our
cases may be in conflict with this conclusion, they must
be considered overruled."
THE ACT OF JUNE 4th, 1901

About five years after these decisions the Act of
1901, P. L. 364, was passed. (Since amended by -the Act
of 1903, P. L. 41.) These acts expressly exempt "places
of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for
private or corporate profit, and institutions of puely
public charity," from municipal claims except for sewers or paving the footways. The first reported case in
which these acts were invoked is Reynoldsville Borough v.
First Methodist Episcopal Church, 19 D. R., 400, but the
church was held liable to pay a paving claim because it
signed the petition to council asking for the paving. It
was held to have estopped itself to take advantage of the
exemption conferred by the act.
In Pittsburgh v. Calvary Cemetery, 44 Super., 289,
the lien was for paving the roadway and the defendant
relied upon the acts mentioned. The city attacked the
constitutionality of the acts as being special legislation.
It was held that the constitution neither authorizes nor
prohibits the enactment of laws exempting real emtate
from assessments for local municipal improvements and
that the classification of the exemtepd property was not
objectionable.
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Again in Carrick v. Canevin, 55 Super., 233 and 243
Pa., 283 the section of the Act of 1901 (section 5) creating
the exemption of cemeteries, etc., was attacked as unconstitutional because not germane to the principal purpose of
the act and in that it contained subject matter not suffiBoth ccrnttntions were
ciently expressed in the title.
overruled.
CHARTER EXEMPTIONS SINCE ACT OF 1901
It was held in Wagner Free Institute v. Phila., 132
Pa., 612, that under Sec. 10 of Art. 16 of the constitution,
the legislature may at any fime repeal an exemption of
property from taxation contained in a charter granted
subsequently to 1857 and such repeal may be made by general enactment. The Act of April 8, 1873, was held to be
a general act having such an effect. So in Phila. v.
Penna. Hospital, 134 Pa., 171, it was held that "such a
grant of exemption cannot bind the state, so to prevent
the subsequent imposition of taxation, unless thade for a
consideration; and neither the fact that the property exempted is applied to charitable uses, in relief of the public,
nor the fact that, subsequent to the statute, contributors
have made large gifts to the- charity, will furnish such
consideration."
In the Urion Dale Cemetery Co.'s Case, 227 Pa., 1,
it appeared that the cemetery had been assessed for a
sewer in the adjoining street. The lower court thought
the assessment proper inasmuch as the Act of 1901 expressly excepted assessments for sewers from those covered by the exempting section. The charter of the cemetery
company exempted its land "from execution, attachment,
taxation, or any other claim, lien or process." This exemption he thought was repealed by the Act of '99, P. L.
100, and the acts referred to. His decision was reversed
on the ground that the acts in question did not revoke the
"The legislature," says Justice Elcharter exemption.
kin, "may subject cemetery companies to taxes, liens and
processes, but since the policy of our State, which reflects
the feeling and sentiment of our people for more than a
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century, has been to regard burial places as sacred places
not subject to writs and processes applicable to other kinds
of property, it is not too much to require that such a radical departure from the fixed policy of the commonwealth
shall be expressed in language so plain as to leave no
doubt as to the legislative intention so to do." * * * * "It
is shocking to one's sense of fitness of things to think of
the consequences that may follow when a writ of execution seizes upon a cemetery set apart for the sole purpose
of a burial ground and a sale is made to a possible speculative purchaser. A decent regard for the memory of
the dead and the feelings of the living demands that
when such a policy is adopted, it should be by express
language and by positive enactment." The fact remains
that the defendant only escaped because of its special
charter immunity, for the court agreed that "it may fairly
be inferred that it was the intention to subject churches
and cemeteries to sewer and sidewalk claims."
There is a striking similarity in the thought and language of this opinion of Justice Elkin and that of Justice
Williams in the case of Phila. v. Burial Ground Society,
178 Pa., 533, above referred to. But Justice Elkin is now
speaking for a unanimous court, whereas Justice Williams
was a sole dissenter, the majority holding that it was the
settled law that cemeteries were liable to assessment for
all kinds of street improvements. This would appear still
to be the law as to sewer and sidewalk claims in the absence of a special charter exemption, and a "burial ground
intended to be a permanent place of sepulture for the
dead becomes a piece of property subject to barter and
trade by the living."
PLACES OF BURIAL HELD FOR PROFIT

To enjoy the exemption created by the Act of 1901,
a place of burial must "not be used or held for private
or corporate profit." In Mt. Oliver Borough v. German
Congregation, 51 Super., 343, it appeared that the church
bought ground for a church cemetery, selling lots to those
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members who could pay for them. The proceeds of sales,
had all the lots been sold, would not have paid for the land
and the improvements, and the cost of maintenance exceeded the revenue, but the cemetery was held liable to
assessment for grading and paving the adjoining street.
The. Superior Court said nothing of a fixed policy to exempt places of burial but it did say that, "in determining
the soundness of a claim for exemption, the statute creating an exempt class must be strictly construed against the
claimant. If his right to the exemption be doubtful, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the state or the municipality in obedience to the principle of government
which requires that the burdens of taxation be equally
borne by all."
Though not in fact profitable, property was held to
be assessable, if the revenue derived from it might be spent
for other purposes. Whether a property is exempt or not
is not to be determined by the "mental attitude of those
who bought it." This intent must be stamped upon the
title to the property as by conveying it in trust for burial
purposes or to a corporation created solely and exclusively
for the purpose of maintaining a place of burial and bound
to devote its revenues to that purpose alone.
As the
church could have sold the unoccupied portion for other
than burial purposes and have used the proceeds as it saw
fit, the ground was to be regarded as "held for profit,"
though not profitable.
SUMMARY

1. It is in violation of the constitution to require a
railroad company to contribute to any kind of paving adjoining its roadbed. This is true of duties imposed under the police power, like the duty to pave and curb the
sidewalks, as well as of duties imposed under the taxing
power, like assessments for paving the roadway. It matters not that the land is owned in fee simple. It matters
not whether the roadbed runs parallel with or runs across
the improvement. The Supreme Court says it cannot be
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benefited and to assess it would be confiscation.
The
same court says every other kind of property is benefited
by any and every kind of street improvement and no judge
or jury may lawfully dispute this declaration.
2. Property separated from a street by a railroad
roadbed is exempt from assessment for improvements made to that street.
3. When the front foot rule is applied, the owners of
the other property abutting upon the improvement pay
the entire cost of it. When the benefit rule is applied, the
extra burden falls on the community as a whole.
4. Railroad stations, yards, offices and unoccupied
ground adjoining the roadbed are liable to assessment for
all kinds of municipal improvements, unless held essential
to the exercise of its franchise. Property so essential is
not real estate unless the legislature clearly expresses its
intention to make .it so. Perhaps even a roadbed could be
assessed for a water pipe, if the legislature so provided.
It has not done so.
5. Street railways are not assessable for improvements to the streets on which they run, as their tracks are
not real estate. Other public utility companies using the
streets are exempt for the same reason. Such companies
may assume such liabilities as charter obligations or to secure the consent of councils to their occupying the streets.
If they do, the burdens are lifted from the owners of adjoining property until the railways are released without
consideration.
6. All public property is exempt from assessment,
e. g. parks, jails, court houses, market places, post offices,
commons, etc., but not property held by a city in trust.
Property owned by a school district is exempt when occupied and used for any of the purposes mentioned in the
school code but the district may lawfully contribute to the
cost of improvements to the streets on which their property abuts.
7. Churches, cemeteries not held for profit, and institutions of purely public charity are liable to assessment
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for sewers and for paving the footways, unless exempted
by their charters. They are exempt from assessment for
any other kind of street improvement. Whether a charter exemption from taxation will protect from a sewer
assessment, only the Supreme Court can tell. An exemption from "taxation" or from "city taxes" is not enough.
An exemption from "taxation except for state purposes
is enough." Probably even this would not be enough to
exempt from the duty to pave the sidewalk as this duty is
not imposed under the taxing power. But a charter exemption from any "lien or process" would exempt even
from this. Unprofitable cemeteries held for profit are assessable for all street improvements, whether actually beneficial or not. The whole cemetery is sold in a lump.
Lots owned by individuals do not need to abut on the improvement nor do their owners require to be notified
of the proceeding. If a church or a charity or a cemetery
signs a petition for an improvement, it forfeits its exemption.
Charter exemptions are liable to repeal unless
bought and paid for. Expenditures in reliance upon the
exemption give no protection against losing it. .Whether
a general act repeals charter exemptions, only the Supreme
Court can tell. It will largely depend upon their view of
public policy at the time.
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
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MOOT COURT
MOSS v. FRY
Specific Performance-Written Agreement to Convey Real Estate
Varied by Parol Evidence-Certified Check as Tender
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fry and wife, by writing agreed to convey to Moss
a certain house if demanded for conveyance, and tender of the price,
were made within 60 days. Subsequently, Fry orally agreed to extend
the period for making demand and payment 15 days. Nothing was
said as to the kind of money in which the tender -hould be made.
On the 14th of the added days, Moss made an oral demand for the
conveyance and tendered a check on a reputable bank of the town
where the property was, which was certified by the bank. Fry refused to accept the check and stated that having changed his mind,
he would not part with the property. This is a bill in equity to compel conveyance.
Thompson S. Martin, for the complainant.
Charles H. Still, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WILSON, J. This is a bill in equity for specific performance. The
complainant bases his right for a decree upon a written offer by
Fry and wife, to convey the land specified at a given price, if acceptance and tender of the price were made within a period of 60
days. Had the complainant averred acceptance and tender within the
period mentioned, he would then have made a prima facie case and,
in the absence of rebutting testimony, would have been entitled to a
decree.
But this he does not do. Instead he avers that, within the
period of 60 days, there was a waver of the 60 days period and an
oral extension by Fry alone of 15 days. Thus he claims a 75 day
period for acceptance. He also avers acceptance and tender on
the 74th day, which is the 14th of the extended period. The acceptance was found to be oral and the tender that of a certified
check on a reputable bank. The defendant does not deny the acceptance as averred but refused to take the check, not objecting to it
as such, but relying on the insufficiency, under the statute of frauds
of the agreement as accepted, to uphold his refusal to convey.
Nothing was said in the original written offer as to the kind
of money in which the tender should be made and no objection to the
check as such was made so the tender is good and the acceptance
complete. Schaeffer v. Coldren, 237 Pa. 77; Phila. Co. v. Renner,
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203 Pa. 144; Pershing v. Fernberg, 22 Pa. 512.
The remaining objection to the enforcement of the agreement
is that it does not satisfy the statute of frauds. The Act of April
22, 1856, P. L. 532, 2 Purd. 1757, provides in its fourth section that
"all declarations * * * * of any lands* * * * and all grants and assignments thereof shall be manifested by Writing ** * * or else to

be void."
Without this statute, an agreement, either in writing or by
parol to sell lands is not valid unless its terms are sufficiently definite to identify the subject of a sale. Under the statute the contract must be in writing or it is void and not enforceable. The
agreement must be in writing, sufficiently definite within itself,
and not require the aid of parol testimony to establish it. If the
written agreement lacks any of the essentials necessary to make
it a complete contract, the statute declares it void. Holthouse v.
Rynd, 9 Sadler 193; Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. 180; Ferguson v. Staver, 33 Pa. 413; Hammer v. McEldowney, 46 Pa. 334; Mellen v.
Davison, 123 Pa. 298; McClug v. Brunot, 183 Pa. 105; Cunningham
v. Nuld, 198 Pa. 41; Agnew v. So. Avenue Land Co., 240 Pa. 192;
Baldridge v. George, 216 Pa., 231; Safety Deposit and Trust Co., of
Pgh. v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100.
Now let us examine the instant case. The complainant to
make his case first brings to our attention a written offer or option to sell, a unilateral nudum pactum. But he does not say that
he accepted according to the terms of the offer. Instead he says
that there was an oral extension and during that extension, he accepted. In other words, the vendee, recognizing the non-acceptance
of the offer as written, and his inability to enforce specific performance of it, seeks to reform the contract by parol and then to have
the contract as thus rectified, specifically carried out by the vendor. The ground on which the reformation is sought is not fraud
or mistake but agreement of the parties.
True, the wife of Fry is not averred to be joined in the extenson but that is not fatal to the prayer of the complainant as the
fact that the wife did not join the husband in an option to sell real
estate will not relieve the husband of the duty of specific performance
if the option is exercised against him. The purchaser may waive
full performance and accept such title as the husband can give.
Hughes v. Antill, 23 Sup. Ct. 290; Burk's Appeal, 75 Pa. 141.
Whenever the oral evidence has furnished a sufficient degree of
proof, our courts, in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, have reformed the writing so as to make it conform to the intention of the
parties. The same rule applies to executory as well as executed
contracts. Equity looks alone to justice and fair dealing and will
command even the law to obey her decree enforcing the true intention of the parties.
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While, therefore, the admissibility of parol evidence, as to
the extension of time, is admitted, it is entirely a different matter
whether the court will or will not decree specific performance of
the agreement in its varied or corrected form where the contract
is required by statute to be in writing. It is one thing to alter or
vary a written contract by parol evidence and quite another to specifically enforce it in its varied or altered form. We are clear that
upon reason and authority, a court of equity cannot vary or rectify
by parol an executory agreement in writing for the sale of lands
and as thus varied, specifically enforce performance of it.
It is settled Penna. Law, declared in numerous cases that where
a written agreement is varied by oral testimony, the whole contract
in legal contemplation, becomes parol. Thus it comes within the
purview of the statute and is subject to its disabling operation. See
S. Dep. & T. Co. v. Coal & Coke Co., supra. Also Glass v. Hulbert,
102 Mass. 24.
Where the people, speaking through the legislative branch of
the government, have declared that contracts relating to certain subjects shall possess certain requisites necessary to their validity, it is
not within the power of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to disregard or annul the mandate. Equity corrects that wherein the
law is deficient, but where the statutory law has spoken, equity
must remain silent. A chancellor cannot by his decree repeal or
set at nought an act of assembly constitutionally valid.
In the present case, it is not the written offer which is sought to
be enforced, it is a new offer; and that new offer and resultant contract, is to be proved partly by the former written memorandum
and partly by oral evidence. The true contract then, cannot be enforced, as our legislature has spoken through the act of 1856. Under that statute, the present contract is a nullity. The statute is
not a mere rule of evidence, but a limitation of judicial authority
to afford a remedy. In our opinion, the case at bar is governed by
the case of Safety Dep. & Trust Co. v. D. Coal & Coke Co. supra.
The above conclusion is in accord with the English doctrine as
announced in Woolham v. Hearn, 7 Ves. Jr. 211. See note in White
& Tudor's Lead. Cases in Eq. 4 Am. Ed. 920-999, and with the
great weight of American authority as evdencied by Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24; Elder v. Elder, 10 Me. 80; Osborne v. Phelps, 19
Conn. 63; MacComber v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 485; Climer v. Hovey,
15 Mich. 18; Davis v. Ely, 104 N. C. 16; Bogard v. Bachan, 52 Ore.
121; Miller v. Chetwood, 2 N. J. Eq. 199; Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Ida.
133.
In the case at bar, there were no features to bring the case out
of the operation of the statute and no estoppel. No exception can
be made in any case like the present except on the ground of equitable estoppel, which did not here arise and cannot arise where the
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contract is executory, and nothing has been done on it on either
side. Glass v. Hulbert, Supra; Worley v. Triggle, 4 Bush., 169.
A refusal to perform may make a party liable for damages
which does not make him subject to the obligation of specific performance.
For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that the written contract or offer cannot be reformed and then specifically enforced
and therefore we dismiss the bill of the complainant without prejudice to his right of action for damages. So decreed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The agreement was to convey "if demand for conveyance and
tender of the price were made within 60 days." The plaintiff tendered , not the price in lawful money, but in a check. A creditor is
not bound to receive a check, whether of an individual or of a bank.
Nothing was done, by the defendant to mislead the plaintiff, as to
the defendant's willingness to take a check instead of money, nor
does it appear that the check being declined, lawful money might not
have been obtained and tendered within the 75 days.
The learned court below has decided that the parol extension
of the time for the demanding of the conveyance imposed no duty on
the defandant specifically to perform the contract. The written offer was to convey, if demand were made in 60 days. The prolongation of the period beyond 60 days was made by an oral offer. The
oral acceptance of this oral offer is the only thing that forms, if anything, a contract. To compel performance of this contract would
be to ignore the statute of fraud. The able opinion of the learned
court below sufficiently justifies the decision reached.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.

WEAVER v. BOROUGH OF X
Gratuitous Bailment-Contributory Negligence of Bailee Imputed
to Bailor
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Weaver, the owner of a horse , lent it without pay to Harris,
in order that the latter might drive to a point in the country and
back. Harris did so and in passing over a street the horse fell into
a hole, which had been left in the street by the negligence of the
borough, and was so badly injured that it had to be killed. Harris
might with proper care have avoided the hole. This is an action for
the loss of the horse whose value was $150.
Shelley, for plaintiff.
Shenton, for defendant,
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OPINION OF THE COURT
YATES, J. The uncontroverted facts established in this case
present an interesting question for decision. Can the contributory
negligence of a gratuitous bailee, be mputed to his bailor, so as to
prevent the latter from recovering damages from a third person
whose negligence, combined with that of the bailee, caused the destruction of the bailor's property at the time in the hands of the
bailee ?
It is not to be disputed that the bailee, by his own contributory
negligence, no matter how slight, if it contributed to the injury
in any degree, is prevented from recovering from" the borough. The
following authority vouches for such statement. Trickett on Borough Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 122; City of Erie v. Magill, 101 Pa. 616;
Monongohela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9; City of Phila. v. Smith, 23
W. N., 242. Is then, his bailor, who had full freedom and power
to choose a bailee who would exercise the requisite care and from
whom legal remedy could be had in case of failure in his duty of care,
to be placed in a better position, so as to increase the liability of the
borough merely because of this bailment to which the borough
was a stranger. We think not.
While there appears to be some division of opinion as to whether
the contributory negligence of a bailee for hire is imputable to his
bailor, yet there looms up not a single precedent where the contributory negligence of a gratuitous is not so imputable. On the contrary, Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. 230, decides that the owner
of a horse, lent without hire is responsible for the negligence of the
borrower, and if the negligence of the latter contributed to the
accident whereby the horse was killed, the owner cannot recover.
Again in Winner v. Oakland Township, 158 Pa. 405-where a husband sought to recover for injuries suffered by his wife and damages to his property due to the negligence of both the wfe and the
Township, the court did not permit him to do so.
There seems to me to be a distinction between the relation of
bailor and bailee, which distinction depends upon the nature of the
bailment. Certainly a gratuitous bailee, one whom the bailor has his
powers of discretion in choosing, should stand in a closer relationship
to his bailor than a bailee for hire. In case of a gratuitous loan the
relation cf master and servant or principal and agent seem to be
created-the bailee having the mere custody of the bailed chattel.
If such be the case, Winner v. Oakland (supra) is directly in point,
as the wife was in such a position to her husband as a servant or
agent is to his master or principal. Trickett in his Boro Law takes
cognizance of this principle.
The same opinion seems to be prevalent thruout the States of
the Union, for in Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Sims, 49 L. R. A., it was
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held that the negligence of a gratuitous bailee of a mule, while
using the animal for the very purpose for which it was loaned, is imputable to the owner, so as to prevent recovery against a third
person whose negligence, combined with that of the bailee caused
the mule's death.
And while authority is so plentiful in re to gratuitous bailees
it is in no wise lacking as regards bailees for hire. The majority
of the cases have held that, if the bailee or his servant, thru negligence, contributed to the injury of goods in his hands, such negligence is imputable to the bailor, so as to prevent a recovery by
him from a third person whose negligence combined with that of
the bailee, caused the injury. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Tankersley, 63
Texas, 57; Ill. C. R. Co. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325; Welty v. Indianapolis
& V. R. Co., 105 Ind., 55.
Acting within the scope of his employment, the negligence of
the agent is imputed to his principal, that of the servant to his
master, and that of the bailee for hire to the bailor (By the majority of cases). Why the contributory negligence of a gratuitous
bailee, while using the property for the very purpose for which it
was loaned, should not be imputed to the bailor who entrusted it to
the bailee to be thus used, we are unable to see. There is the same
privity of contract in all essential features, as in a bailment for
hire, and as engagements between principal and agent and master
and servant. This view is reinforced by the consideration of another
question, viz: Could a gratuitous bailee who was guilty of contributory negligence recover in his own name against a stranger for an injury to property loaned? Certainly not, for the defense of this complaint would be upon the service. But the baior and bailee must
recover, if at all, upon the same facts, and under the same circumstances. Whatever entitles to a recovery entitles either bailor or
bailee to such recovery. E conversd, whatever forbids a recovery to
the bailee will also defeat the bailor's action.
While so much authority can be cited on the imputing of negligence in cases of bailment for hire, there is also a certain amount
of opinion contra. Gibson v. Bessemer & L. E. R. Co., 226 Pa.,
198, is the leading case of this kind in Pa. But in this, the only
case supporting the doctrine asserted by Judge Thompson is N. Y.
& L. E. & W. R. Co. v. N. J. Electric R. Co-, 60 N. J. L., 338, and
this is a case of a bailment for hire. He relies also on Bard v.
Yohn, 26 Pa., 482, but the facts of this case seem vitally different.
In cases of bailment for hire it would perhaps be less practicable from the standpoint of conducting a business to require the
same degree of diligence in the section of a bailee who will be careful and legally responsible than if the bailor was to realize nothing
from the transaction. There is perhaps more justification here in
allowing the fact of a bailment relation to make a third party liable
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where in the absence of such relation he would not be liable. In
such case also the duty of care of the bailee and third party to the
bailor is the same.
,The cases in Pa. holding that right of a bailor as against third
parties for injuries to the bailed property cannot be better than
that of his bailee without hire have never been overruled and should
not be.
If this was a case of bailment for hire, we might not so hastily
come to a conclusion but as we think that the case of a gratuitous
bailee presents a greater argument and is sustained by an abundance
of authority, we feel that it is proper and just to render judgment for
the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is difficult to justify the distinction which has been drawn
between the negligence of a bailee for hire and that of a gratuitous
bailee, in respect to its effect on the capacity of the bailor to obtain damages for injury to the thing bailed from one whose negligence, co-operating with that of the bailee, has caused the injury.
In Winner's Appeal, 158 Pa., 405, 410; and in Forks Township v.
King, 84 Pa., 230, the gratuitous bailor was not allowed to recover
for injury to the thing, caused by defendant's negligence, although
the bailee's negligence contributed to the result. On the other
hand, the negligence of the bailee for hire, e. g. of a horse and buggy,
Gibson v. Railroad Co., 37 Super., 70; 226 Pa., 198, is not imputed to
the bailor.
If there were negligence in allowing the bailee, whether gratuitous or not, to obtain possession of the thing, that might justify
defiying to the bailor the right to recover for injury caused by the
concurring negligence of the bailee and the defendant. When there
is no negligence in the devolution of the possession and management of the thing on the bailee, it ought not to be material whether
he was one for hire or gratuitous. But very often lex stat pro
ratione.
Judgment affirmed.
HARRISON v, PENNSYLVANIA CO.
Respective Rights of Bond and Interest Coupon Holders in the Distribution of the Proceeds of a Sale of Property Mortgaged to
Protect the Bonds
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant created a mortgage to protect 100 bonds of
$500 each. These bonds were payable in 1920, coupons being attached for interest every six months. In 1914 a sale of the mort-
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gaged property was made under order of court. The proceeds for
distribution are $160,000. Harrison holds 5 bonds, all the coupons
on which are still attached to it unpaid though 4 of them were past
due, at the time of the sale. Other persons hold coupons which have
been severed from other bonds. These contend that they are to share
ratably in the distribution among the coupon holders before any part
of the principal of the bonds is paid. Harrison contends that the
coupons are not to share at all until the principal of the bonds is
paid or that they are to share ratably with principal only.
Raker, for plaintiff.
Grim. for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SMITH, J. This court has been unable to discover for what
reason Harrison brought this action. The proceeds of the sale of the
mortgaged premises are far more than enough to pay both the principal and coupons. We suppose, however, that these 100 bonds are
not the only obligations of the company and as a result either the
coupons or principal must be wholly or in part unpaid. Be it as it
may, the question involved is whether the holders of the severed
coupons are to share ratably among coupon holders before any of
the principal is paid or whether they are not to share until the
principal is paid or ratably with the principal only.
Counsel for both the plantiff and defendant cite cases which
have nothing whatever to do with the question at bar.
From a review of the authorities it is very evident that the
contention of the holders of the detached coupons cannot be sustained. The coupons which they hold are admitted to be negotiable
by all. They pass by delivery and will sustain a claim for the
amounts which they represent. Thompson on Corporations V. sec.
6108; 5 Cyc., 780; Evertson v. Natonal Bank, 66 N. Y., 14.
This fact, however, does not give the coupons which have been
detached any preference over other coupons and the principal debt.
While they are entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of the mortgage, they have no equity superior to that of the bond from which
they were taken and their holders are not entitled to any priority
over the bondholders in a final distribution of the proceeds of the
whole mortgaged property. They are entitled to share pro rata with
the holders of the remander of the debt. The mortgage was given
as a security for both principal and interest, with no priority to
either. Miller v. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 40 Vt., 399; Sewall v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 364; Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659. The holder of
coupons cannot, by levying his execution upon the property conveyed in the mortgage, get a preference over the holders of other
bonds and coupons of the same series. Thompson V., see. 6109.
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All the authorities agree that the bond and the attached coupons is an obligation protected by the mortgage and if the holder
of the bond chooses to sever it from its coupons, he thereby divides
the obligation, and the holder of the coupons becomes equitably the
owner of a proportion of the bond. Real Estate Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co., 237 Pa., 311. Coupon bonds issued
by municipal and other corporations and their coupons when detached are negotiable instruments and may be sued on separately.
Kenosha v. Lamson, 76 U. S. 477; Woods v. Lawrence Co., 66 U. S.
386; Beaver Co. v. Armstrong, 44 Pa., 63; Spooner v. Holmes, 102
Mass. 503.
The case of 237 Pa., 311, is not applicable to the case at bar
because there, a clause in the mortgage provided that the net proceeds of a sale by the trustee under the mortgage should be applied "first -towards payment to holders of unpaid bonds-of
all arrearages of interest remaining unpaid on such bonds." Therefore it was held that a bona fide holder of coupons detached from
bonds secured by a corporate mortgage, who is not the holder of
the bonds themselves, is entitled to a preference in the proceeds of a
foreclosure sale. In addition to the clause quoted it was shown that
unless the case was decided thus, the holders of coupons detached
from the bonds would not be paid at all, the conditions of the mortgage providing in what order creditors should be paid and not naming holders of detached coupons.
Therefore, since the holders of detached coupons cannot be preferred to the bondholders, we must hold that they can share only
ratably with the principal. Let there be a pro rata distribution of
the proceeds of the mortgage sale among the coupon holders and the
principal.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
No reason is apparent for preferring the interest on the bonds
to their principal, nor vice versa, for preferring the principal to the
interest. The interest is a part of the debts. The various claimants,
on account of bonds or coupons, should share in the distribution
ratably with their claims. Therefore the appeal must be dismissed.

HIBBEN v. SHUMAN
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Admissibility of Dying Declarations in Civil Cases
Action on a promissory note purporting to be executed to Shuman, who alleges that it is a forgery. In the transaction out of
which the note is alleged to have grown, Porter, now dead, acted as
agent for Hibben. Hibben offered to prove that Porter, three hours
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before he died of a disease and in full knowledge that he was dying,
declared that the note had been signed by Shuman for the con.
sideration now alleged by the plaintiff. The court rejected the
evidence.
Pifer, for plaintiff.
Rosenberg, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCRIBNER, J. The only question in this case is whether a declaration of facts material to the issue, made by a person under a
conviction of inevitable and. impending death, is admissible, when
made out of court, not under oath and not shown to have been made
in the presence of any representative of the opposing side.
Since the declaration of the facts in this case contains no
statement that the declaration was in writing, we will consider it to
have -been oral.
The evidence offered and here under consideration is clearly
a species of hearsay.
(Anderson's Dict. Law, 507).
Such evidence is, with a few exceptions inadmissible.
(Anderson's Dict.
Law, p. 507).
The only exceptions to the hearsay rule which could possibly
be applicable to the case at bar and on some of which the counsel
have insisted are:
(a) Declarations against an interest, in which the declarations
of a 3rd party give rise to an inference of the truth of alleged
facts opposed to the interests of the declarant. This is clearly not
the case here.
(b) Where the declaration is part of the res gestae, it may be
admitted as such. This exception has no application here, for the
res gestae is the note and the declaration is not a part thereof.
Further, the declaration of the agent was not contemporaneous
with the execution of the note, nor was it spontaneous, nor was it
shown to have been in the line of the agent's duty.
(c) The doctrine of dying declarations: A dying declaration
is a statement of facts concerning cause and circumstances of a
homicide made by the deceased under a fixed and solemn belief that
his death is near at hand, and as such is admissible in evidence.
(21 Cyc., 973).
Dying declarations are admissible in cases of homicide only
(21 Cyc., 981). They are by statute (June 25, 1895, P. L. 444), admissible in cases of abortion.. They are admissible at common law
only where the death of the declarant is the subject of the charge.
(21 Cyc., 982 N. 67).
The technical doctrine of dying declarations is consequently
not applicable to the present instance which is a civil case and not
concerned with homicide, the declarant dying of a disease.
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This case is rather that of a death bed declaration, which includes the technical dying declaration, and which is a statement of
facts material to an issue made by a person under a conviction of
inevitable and impending death. This distinction is made because
some of the courts have confused the meaning of 'dying declaration'
by using it in it's technical as well as it's ordinary sense. A death
bed declaration is not admissible in civil cases. Friedman v. Railroad Co., 1 Phila., 203; Wilson v. Bowen, 15 Johnsoi, 284.
There is a class of courts which favor the admission of death
bed declarations in all or nearly all cases. They base their argument on the fact that such a-declaration is made when the declarant
is standing, so to speak, before his Maker, in fear of eternal punish.
ment and in hopes of eternal happiness; and that therefore any
statements which such a person may make, will be truthful statements, for such statements, according to the theories of our religion,
tend to culminate in the realization of his hopes; and that the solemnity of the occasion together with the likelihood of truthfulness,
takes the place of the otherwise necessary oath. We do not agree
with such logic for, granting it to be true, the oath also contains
those qualifications of truthfulness and solemnity and in addition a
promise of truthfulness which is lacking in a death bed declaration.
The law has established the oath as the necessary prerequisite to the
admission of testimony and we do not sanction any sustitubte therefor.
Death bed declarations are also open to the objections to hearsay
evidence of which they are a part. The most important of these
objections are: (a) There is no opportunity to examine the maker
of the declaration and thus ascertain any irregularities or untruths
in it; cross examination of the witness testifying to the making of
the declaration for such a purpose would obviously be useless. (b)
There is no oath. (See above). (c) The prejudices of, or unwitting misinterpretation by the witness may prevent a faithful narration of the declaration. (d) The condition of the declarant in a
deathbed declaration is such as to render probable unintentional inaccuracies or omissions, which, if corrected, would change -the form
and meaning of the declaration.
We thing that death bed declarations, therefore, should not e
admitted in evidence except in the most restricted cases and even
then, although the rule is well settled as to homicide and abortion,
we doubt the propriety of the admission.
Thus it is seen that the evidence offered in the case at bar
is hearsay; is not admissible under any of the exceptions to the
inadmissibility of hearsay and that it is subject to the most important objections to the admission of hearsay as evidence.
Further, a principal cannot offer as evidence unsworn statements of his agent made in his favor, Harrington v. Bronson,
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161 Pa., 296; Moulton v. O'Bryen, 17 Sup. Ct., 593, either before or
after the death of the agent. (16 Cyc. 1206).
Material declarations of 3rd persons, objectionable as hearsay,
are not rendered competent by the fact of the death of said 3rd
party. Hogg v. Wilkins, 1 Grant 67; Lessee of Bonnett v. Smith,
3 Binney 175; Lessee of Galloway v. Oleg, 2 Binney 468.
An examination of the statutes reveals an absence of legislation on this subject.
Our decision, in the light of the above discussion, is that the
evidence was rightly rejected.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
"It is undisputed," said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Railing v. C., 110 Pa., 100, "that in all civil cases such (dying)
declarations are entirely incompetent." "They have been viewed,"
said the court in Friedman v. Railroad Co. as an exceptional
growth of the criminal law which has no place in civil jurisprudence."
These statements are in accord with the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions. See 56 L. R. A., 363.

TOMLIN v. SANDOW
Evidence-Expert Testimony-Surgeon's Opinion as to an Operation
Described by Witnesses
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

Sandow a surgeon performed an operation on Tomlin's eye the
character of which was described by witnesses. A surgeon who
had heard the description was asked, whether in his opinion, an
operation of that kind was safe.,He said not. The operation was
followed by the complete loss of sight. To the surgeon's testimony
it was objected that as a witness he was testifying to the very subject about which it was the jury's function to have an opinion.
Baldwin for plaintiff.
Chase for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
COURTNEY, J. We think the evidence in this case should
have been admitted. An operation has been performed on Tomlin's eye by Sandow, a surgeon; and in consequence of which Tom.
lin has completely lost his sight. The character of this operation
was described by witnesses whose testimony we assume was substantially the same. A surgeon, who was present and had heard
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the description, was asked whether in his opinion an operation of
that kind was safe. He said not. This testimony was objected to
because the surgeon as a witness was testifying to the very subject
about which it was the jury's function to have an operation.
The law recognizes the testimony of experts as proper to be
presented to the jury. A witness, who is shown to the satisfaction
of the court to be a competent surgeon may state facts known to
qualified members of his profession as to the effect, extent, and
tendency of professional knowledge regarding a surgical operation
on the body or mind but not upon the moral nature. 17 Cyc., 73.
The question therefore is, whether a surgeon's opinion as to an
operation, the description of which is derived from the testimony of
witnesses, is admissible.
In Greenleaf on Evidence, pp. 440, the general rule is stated that,
on questions of science, skill, trade, or others of the like kind, persons of skill, sometimes called experts, may not only testify to
facts, but they are permitted to give their opinions in evidence.
In Coyle v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa., 117, it was held that,
where, in a proper case for expert testimony the facts are admitted,
or proved by evidence which is not conflicting, the opinion of an expert upon such facts is admissible as a scientific deduction.
Forbes v. Caruther, 3 Yeates 527, held that, mere abstract of
opinion is not evidence, but that the opinion of men of science upon
facts stated may be received to inform the jury. Thus a physician,
who has not seen the particular patient may, after hearing the
evidence of others, be called to prove upon his oath, the general
affects of a particular disease, and its probable consequences in the
particular case.
In Olmstead & Bailey v. Gere, 4 Out., 127, the upper court reversed the lower court for rejecting the following question put to a
physician as an expert: (Q) From the testimony you have heard
as to the mode in which this limb was treated by Dr. Bailey, and
from the results you find upon the limb was there an unsuccessufl
management on his part? The upper court held that an opinion
derived from both sources was competent.
In Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa., 450, the court held that
the witness cannot be asked to state his opinion upon the whole
case because that necessarily includes the determination of what
are the facts, and that can only be done by the jury. But, if the
facts are stated hypothetically in one question, or if the whole of
the testimony delivered by one of the parties, or by certain of the
witnesses, for one party, is made known to the expert either by his
reading it or hearing it, and he is then asked his opinion upon it
assuming it to be true, in either case the opinion is sought upon an
assumed state of facts and may therefor be given.
People v. Barber, 115 N. Y., 475 held: The opinion of medical

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

experts as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant based upon testimony in the case, assumed for the purpose of examination to be
So in connection with their
true, was undoubtedly competent.
opinions they could be permitted to state the reasons upon which
their opinions were founded. But inferences from facts proved are
to be drawn and found by the jury, and cannot be proved as facts by
opinion of witnesses.
The case of People v. McElvaine, 121 N. Y., 250, cited by the defendant does not apply. In that case thi question asked the expert was concerning all the testimony given at the trial, the act of
the defendant on the night of the homicide, the testimony as to
his past life given by witnesses in his defense, and based upon the
whole case. The question covered a long case and conflicting testimony on both sides and therefor was entirely too general. Nor do
we think Link v. Sheldon, 136 N. Y., 1, applies, as in that case there
was a disagreement among the experts themselves.
If the facts in this case were contradictory the surgeon's testimony would not be admissible, unless the question was given
hypothetically so that the jury would know upon what set of facts
Coyle v. Commonwealth,
the witness was placing his testimony.
104 Pa., 117.
The question asked in this case required no expression of opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses or truth of the facts but
left that matter entirely to the jury. The question required a
scientific deduction from the facts given and as a medical expert
was the only one who could give such; we think his testimony
should have been admitted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
One of the questions to be decided by the jury was, "what was
done by the defendant, in the so-called "operation" on Tomlin's
Was
eye?
Another question was, was it "safe" to do this?
the probability that it would relieve the defect of the eye, and not
still further impair it, sufficiently great to justify the operation?
It was this second question that the witness was asked to answer. Was the operation in his opinion safe?
The witness was then to express an opinion on one of the points
on which the jury, in their verdict, were to express an opinion. Was
the witness' opinion for this reason t0 be excluded? That it
should have been, would be the answer that some courts would give.
"To permit the witness to give his opinion on the ultimnate fact,"
28, 101
says Cortwright, J., in Keefe v. Armour & Co., 258 Ill.,
N. "E., 252, "was to supplant the jury by a witness, and practically
take from the defendant the right to a judgment of the jury as to the
proper inferences to be drawn from the facts." Several cases of a
similar import, are cited in 32 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, p. 191.
We think there is no force in this objection. When A is on
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trial for shooting B, and X testifies that A shot B, he is expressing
an opinion, or a knowledge, on the very point on which the jury is
expected to express an opinion. But no one has supposed that X
is for that reason, not to be allowed to testify.
When the expert testified that the operation was not safe, it
was still for the jury to decide whether it would accept his opinion.
It might decide in an opposite sense.
The opinion of the learned court below fortifies its conclusion
with appropriate authorities. Affirmed.
JOHN SAPLEIN v. AMOS HOGDSON
Discharge of Surety.

Estoppel

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Saplein lent $1000.00 to Jameson, who with Hogdson as surety
gave to him a note payable Aug. 13, 1913. Hogdson on Dec. 14,
1913, asked Saplein whether the note had been paid and received the
answer "Yes." Saplein did not intend to deceive but had in mind
another of Jameson's notes, which had been paid. Had Hogdson
known the fact, he could on paying the note, have recovered from
Jameson at least two-thirds of the amount due on it. At time of the
suit, Jameson had gone to a distant State, and was without property.
This is a suit on the note.
Bashore for plaintiff.
Ingram for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MOROSINI, J. It is a well settled principle of law that a creditor may proceed against the surety before he proceeds against the
principal debtor and he is not obliged to resort to any legal means
against the said debtor, unless he is notified to do so by the surety.
Geddis v. Hawk, 1 W., 280.
The defendant in this case has set up as a defense the doctrine
of estoppel. It is his contention that Saplein should be estopped from
denying that the note is paid, and that he (Saplein) should be precluded from recovering on this note because of the answer he gave
The surety, Hogdson, asked the creditor, Saplein,
to Hodgson.
whether the note had been paid and received the answer, "Yes."
Now the question is, shall the creditor be allowed to recover againt
the surety' or is he now estopped from doing so?
An estoppel is the preclusion of a person from asserting a fact,
by previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own part or on the
part of those under whom he claims, or by an adjudication upon his
rights which he cannot be allowed to call in question. Bouvier, Dict.
694. An estoppel is a preclusion in law, which prevents a man from
alleging or denying a fact in consequence of his previous act, allegation or denial of a contrary tenor. Stephen Pleading, 239.
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An estoppel is an admission or determination under circumstances of such solemnity that the law will not allow the fact so admitted
or estabished to be afterwards drawn in question by the parties.
They are sustained to exclude the truth, where the parties have so
acted as to induce the belief that the circumstances were otherwise
and others have acted on such belief, whose interests would be injuriously affected by setting up the true state of facts. Water's Appeal, 35 Pa., 523; Orr v. Mercer Ins. Co., 114 Pa., 391; Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass., 203.
At common law estoppes were confined, except in a few cases,
to those arising from deeds and records of court. Mere acts, statements, or admissions of a party, when not performed or made under
seal or of record, or in some of those ways to which peculiar authority is attached by law, were not at common law considered as estoppels, but might be explained or rebutted.
But the common law was found to be inadequate for the attainment of equity,
and hence the equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais of today. The
doctrine of estoppel in pais originated in equity, it is now very generally applied in cases arising in courts of law. It is no longer regarded as a merely technical rule of evidence, but as a part of the substantive law which regulates rights and duties. The rule as it is now
applied is: where one who has made statements to another, upon
which the latter has acted, he will be estopped from afterwards denying. to the prejudice of that other the truth of such statement. 11
Amer. & Eng. Cyc. of Law, 420.
The doctrine is laid down in Halsbury's Laws of Eng., Vol. 13,
P. 323, as follows: where one has conducted himself that another
would, as a reasonable man, understand that a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted upon, and that other has acted
on such representation and thereby altered his position to his pred.
judice, an estoppel arises against the party who made the representation and he is not allowed to aver that the fact is otherwise
than he represented it to be.
It is contended by the plaintiff that Saplein did not intend to
deceive and therefore should not be estopped from now asserting his
claim. While it is often laid down as a general proposition, that to
constitute an estoppel, it must be shown that the person sought to be
estopped has made an admission, or done an act with the intention
of influencing the conduct of another, or which he has reasons to believe will influence that other, inconsistent with the evidence which
he proposes to give or title he proposes to set up, (11 Amer. & Eng.
Cye., 430) it appears howeevr to be the prevailing rule that it is not
essential that the -conduct creating the, estoppel should be characterized by an actual intention to mislead or deceive. If, whatever a
man's real intention may be, he so c6nducts -himself that a reasonable man would take the act or representation to be true, and be-
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lieve that,it was meant that he should act upon it, and he did act upon
'it as true, the party making the representation will be procluded
from contesting its truth. Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn., 118; Tiffany
v. Anderson, 55 Iowa, 405; Martin v. Main Cent. R. Co., 82 Me., 105;
Vannerer v. Crossman, 42 Mich., 465; Raley v. Williams, 73 Mo., 310;
Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y., 228.
In Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn., 128, the court said: "The word
willfully as used in this connection is not to be taken in the limited
sense of the term 'maliciously' or of the term 'Fraudulently' nor
does it of necessity imply an active desire to produce a particular impression or to induce a particular line of conduct. Whatever the
motive may be, if one so acts or speaks that the natural consequence
of his words and conduct will be to influence another to change hig
condition, he is legally chargeable with an intent to induce the other
to believe him, and to act upon that belief, if such proves to be the
actual result. It is enough that a reasonable man in the situation
of that other would believe that it was meant that he should act upon
it."
A case analogous to this case is that of Sessions v. Rice, reported
in 70 Iowa, 306. Here after the maturity of the note, the responsibility of the principal became doubtful, though he still had sufficient
property to pay the note. While the principal was in this condition,
the surety inquired of the creditor whether the note had been paid,
and was told that it had been paid. The surety relied on this statement and took no further steps to protect himself and later the principal became insolvent.
The lower court charged that "an estoppel arises only where
the party against whom it is set up Intended that his conduct,
whether consisting of words or actiobs, should be relied upon by the
other party." On appeal it was held that this was error and that
the test question is as to WHETHER THE PARTY SETTING UP
THE ESTOPPEL WAS JUSTIFIED IN RELYING UPON THE
CONDUCT OF THE OTHER PARTY.
In the ease of Mfg. & Traders Bank v. Hazard, reported in 30
N. Y., 226, it was held that it is not necessary to an equitable estoppel
that the party should design to mislead.
In the case of Continental Bank v. Bank of the Commonwealth,
50 N. Y., 575, it was held not to be always necessary to an estoppel
that there should be an intention, upon the part of the person making
a declaration or doing an act, to mislead the one who is induced to
rely on it. Justice Folger goes on to say that "It would limit the
rule much within the reason of it, if it were restricted to cases where
there was an element of fraudulent purpose. In very many of the
cases in which the rule has been applied there was no more than
negligence on the part of him who was estopped.
It is a well and generally recognised principle of eatoppel in
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pais, that if in the transaction itself which is in dispute, a party has
by his negligence, led another to believe a certain state of facts and
the other relying thereon, had been led to act or refrain from acting
when he otherwise would, and is prejudiced thereby the party at
fault cannot be heard afterwards to show that the state of facs referred to did not exist. 40 L. R. A., 498.
Both of the parties in this case were acting in perfect good faith.
The loss to be sustained is directly attributable to the negligence of
Saplein, the plaintiff, and it would be unjust and inequitable to impose the burden of paying the same on the defendant Hogdson, who
is without fault.
It is a familiar rule that, when one of two innocent parties must
suffer, the law throws the loss on him by whose negligence or fault,
the loss occurs.
It is contended that what Saplein said was ambiguous, and that
Hogdson should not have relied upon it. We think that under the
circumstances the word was susceptible of only one meaning for
every person will be conclusively presumed to intend to be understood according to the reasonable import of his words; and where previous words are thus reasonably understood and justly acted upon by
another, such person cannot be heard to aver to the contrary as
against the other. Therefore if Hogdson made inquiry of Saplein,
as to whether or not the note had been paid, and Saplein told him
"Yes," it is not now for Saplein to say that he did not intend that
Hogdson should govern himself according to the answer.
Judgment is therefore given for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The surety was induced by the statement of the creditor, to believe
that the debt had been paid. This, had no mischief resulted to the
surety, would not have discharged him. But, mischief did result. Had
the surety known that the debt had not been paid, he could have recovered from the debtor at least two-thirds of the amount. We must assume that what he could have recovered, he would have recovered.
He would then, but for the misinformation, have recovered $666.68.
To this extent, he must be deemed discharged.
The ignorance of Saplein of the fact, when he made the statement is immaterial. One of two innocent persons must suffer, he or.
Hogdson. He is the cause of the loss. It should abide with him.
The burden of showing that a loss resulted from the misinformation is on the defendant. He has shown a loss of not more than
$666.66. He must be held liable therefore for the remaining $333.34.
There was error in entering judgment for the defendant.
As bearing on the question presented, see Childs' Suretyship and
Guaranty, p. 265; Wilkins v. Hanson, 119 Minn., 399; 32 Amer. &
Eng. Ann. Cases, p. 57.
Ieversed with v. I. d. 71.

